International Support for Addis's Right of Access to the Red Sea
Jacob Haile-Mariam - May 17, 2002

Development scholars and practitioners continue to tell us that sustained peace and stability are preconditions for economic progress. The economic backwardness of many countries including Ethiopia and Eritrea, may, to a large extent, be attributed to the perpetual war and strife that these countries find themselves in.

Even with the right policies, dedicated and visionary leadership, which are in a short supply in Africa, without political stability and peace, economic development is as pipe dream. It follows then that peace and stability, hence economic prosperity can be achieved only when the causes of war are done away with.

The objective of this commentary is to warn both Ethiopian and Eritrean feuding camps that simple window dressing will not do this time. What is required is nothing short of total elimination of the causes that will make future wars inevitable.

Ethiopia and Eritrea are now regrettably locked in a senseless war where the final tallies will show that there is in fact, no victor or vanquished, because, though, Ethiopia in the long run may come out on top, it nonetheless stands to lose also. As millions of dollars are spent for military hardware which can go up in flames within minutes, and as the young productive human resources become canon fodder, whatever little economic gains these countries have made will vanish. To make matters worse, any conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia has the potential of spilling over to the rest of Eastern Africa due to the consuming enmity of well known outside forces towards Ethiopia. In fact any conflict Ethiopia may have with its neighbors, which we hope will never come about, will always provoke the wrath of these forces against Ethiopia, disproving our infantile contention during Emperor Haile Sellasie's rule, that the animosity of some leaders towards Ethiopia was due to Halile Selassie's misguided Middle Eastern policy, which maintained close relationship with Israel and the West. Because of the volatility of the geopolitical situations of the area, Ethiopia therefore, can secure its peace only with a gesture of good neighborliness reinforced with strength.

Rarely do people willingly fight a war, for war is no banquet or picnic. In most situations people are dragged into war in defense of what they regard as sacred or may temporarily be duped by leaders who may use war for a variety of pretexts including their failures as leaders. To avoid war, the cause which gives rise to war must be expunged and settled fairly and judiciously through negotiations. There can however be no durable peace unless the rights of a country and its people are observed. Genuine peace cannot be bought at the expense of any of the parties to a conflict.

At the advent of the 21st century, settlement of conflicts by force is not only regarded as passe, but is looked at as barbaric and uncivilized. War between countries therefore is quite rare these days. Today we are in an era where conflicts are settled through negotiations between the conflicting parties, mediations by the good offices of countries or the international organizations, resort to arbitration or litigation. The international Court of Justice at The Hague has never been busier.

It is from this perspective of peace and not from the desire for territorial aggrandizement that we plead for the legitimate right of access of Ethiopia to the sea. Ethiopia has more than enough territory and the size of a territory is not important in this age of technology where prosperity depends on the effective harnessing of that technology rather than possession of a vast stretch of arid lands. Without Ethiopia's legitimate right of access to the sea, there cannot be durable peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. How can a country of 60 million people be landlocked for the first time in its long history when the sea is only a walking distance away from its border and hope for peace? How can the peace, the security and the development of a country be held hostage by another and hope that there will be peace between the hostage taker and the victim. If Ethiopia's right of access to the sea is not settled now fairly and judiciously, to the satisfaction of everyone concerned it will only mean postponing the war for the next generation. No society willingly brings about its own demise by allowing itself to be slowly asphyxiated by completely isolating it from the rest of the world.

As all wars, this war between Ethiopia and Eritrea sooner or later, hopefully sooner than later, will end. Ethiopia and Eritrea are not destined to be eternal enemies. With the recognition of each other's rights, without any special relationship there is no reason why they cannot live in peace. In fact Eritrea can extract more from Ethiopia through peaceful normal relations than through conflict, their turbulent marriage over the last thirty years should serve them as a lesson for determining the parameters of their future relationships. Marriage the second time around may sound sweeter because one of the spouses having shed off some weight may now look more attractive than ever, or it may dawn on the spouse who demanded the divorce that the other spouse was after all a good provider. But then the umbilical chord tying the two peoples is severed and it is hard to imagine in the foreseeable future that there are such skilled surgeons in the area to reconnect it. Until the umbilical chord is reconnected if ever, Ethiopia's policy towards Eritrea should be one informed by good neighborliness, but with no special relationship.

In the future negotiations following cessation of hostilities, Ethiopia's right of access to the sea should take precedence over all other agenda items. All other issues, such as trade relations, citizenship, the claim for war reparations, etc. must be predicated upon successful settlement of the incorporation of Assab into Ethiopia.

Eritrea at independence had in fact no international borders with Ethiopia because it was an integral part of Ethiopia. The internal administrative border with Tigray was not well delimited, because there was no need for such an exercise. Assab was part of Wollo Province. Therefore at independence there was really no such a thing as Eritrea with definite borders. When Eritreans voted in favor of the bizarre referendum question "do you want to be free"? as if any body in his right might would want to be a slave, they voted for a concept known as Eritrea and not for a definite geographic entity. The international community also recognized an indefinite territory, which generally lies North of the Ethiopian territory of Tigray as a sovereign state knowing fully well that Eretrean border with Ethiopia will be negotiated and delimited. Therefore every part of Eritrea is an appropriate subject for negotiation between the Ethiopian and Eritrean Governments. The following authoritative statements by different countries and the United Nations make it clear that Eritrean borders have to be negotiated, delimited and demarcated with certain adjustments which will give Ethiopia an access to the sea.

After Italy was defeated by the allied powers, the United Stated Delegation to the Treaty of Peace with Italy on September 24, 1945 raised the question of Italy's aggression against Ethiopia. In his submission to the Deputies from the Council of Foreign Ministers the leader of the US Delegation said, "There will be, however, a territorial cession in favor of Ethiopia, which will give Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Assab." This was not a compensation to be awarded to an aggressed country by an aggressor, rather it was an unequivocal recognition of Ethiopia's legitimate right of access to the sea.

In various international fora, including at the meeting where the Treaty of Peace with Italy, Ethiopia made no secret of her belief that Eritrea has for thousands of years been one of the oldest part of its territory and its outlet to the sea. In this Conference the Ethiopian delegation again eloquently asserted Ethiopia's right to the entire territory of the former Italian colony and her right of access to the sea. While few at the Conference objected to Ethiopia's demand, including of course Egypt, there were many, who supported Ethiopia's position mainly because of the need to give Ethiopia and access to the sea.

Even Italy, the colonial owner of Eritrea after launching three aggressive wars from her colonial territory against Ethiopia, did not ever question the right of access of Ethiopia to the sea. In the same conference cited here above, Italy, while arguing that Eritrea should be put under its trusteeship, to which Ethiopia objected in the strongest terms possible, at the same time conceded, "The Italian Government who had been the first, already in 1928, to reach an agreement with the Ethiopian Government for an outlet to the sea for Ethiopia, have again since then declared [its] readingess to accept a new practicable solution of this problem as may be devised." There is no doubt in the Italian statement that the Italian Deputy meant giving Assab to Ethiopia, possibly more, when he said that the Italian Government will accept practical solution to Ethiopia's right of access to the sea.

U.S has never, perhaps except in recent years, wavered in its acknowledgment of Ethiopia's unassailable right of access to the sea. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State in his address to the Third Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1949 said, "To avert the possibility of [Eritrea] being used at any future time as a base against Ethiopia, and to give that State [Ethiopia] access to the sea, the Eastern part of Eritrea, including Massawa should be incorporated in Ethiopia."

The leader of the British delegation to the same General Assembly of the United Nation, Mr. McNeil stating the position of the United Kingdom said with no equivocation that "The territory ceded to Ethiopia should include the Danakil Coast, the Port of Assab...."

The position of the French Government was no different from those of British and the United States. France favored "annexation of Southern region purpose of ceding the Southern part of Eritrea was not to aggrandize the Ethiopian territory, rather it was to acknowledge the inescapable Ethiopia's right of access to the sea.

Anderei Gromyko, the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the now defunct Soviet Union, while sternly objecting to the assignment of Eritrea to Italy in Trusteeship, a position which was supported by the United States, Great Britain, France and other European powers, he never raised and objection to that part of the proposal which ceded Assab to Ethiopia. In fact he endorsed the measure.

In this connection it is worth mentioning the imperialist design of Egypt over the Nile Basin countries, including, Ethiopia, Uganda, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Tanzania. It was for the furtherance of this sinister imperialist objective that Egypt put a claim on Eritrea as a former colonial surrogate of the Ottoman Turks, whose hold on Eritrea was brief and tenuous.

After the Treaty between the Axis Powers and defeated Italy was signed, there remained the outstanding question of disposing the former Italian colonies. The General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 289 (IV) dealing with Disposal of the Former Italian Colonies formed a Commission consisting of five member states, namely Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan and Union of South Africa. The Commission was instructed to ascertain more fully the wishes and the best means of promoting the welfare of the inhabitants of the former colonies taking into account particularly:

"c) the rights and claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic, or economic reasons, including in particular Ethiopia's legitimate need for adequate access to the sea.."

While the majority of the commission members recommended federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, Norway recommended the annexation of the whole of Eritrea to Ethiopia.

Finally the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 390 (V) passed on 2nd December 1950 taking into account inter alia the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea, the interest of peace and security in East Africa and in particular Ethiopia's legitimate need of for adequate access to the sea, recommended that the Eritrea be federated with Ethiopia.

The UN representatives who had been given the mandate to recommend dispensations for colonial Eritrea were less concerned about joining the kin and kith straddling along the borders, rather their concern as a UN body was more for ensuring future peace and security of the region, which they recongized could not be secured while Ethiopia would be asphyxiated by making it completely and totally land locked.

Conclusion

It is clear from the above that the United Nations, the various Commissions and many individual countries have acknowledged Ethiopia's right of adequate access to the sea. From Ethiopia's perspective, adequate access means the Red Sea coast that includes Massawa and Assab-the country's gateway for over a millennium.

The credibility of a nation depends on its steadfast adherence to its earlier pronouncement and the principles it espoused. Under international law the actions of an earlier government is binding on the subsequent one, of course with certain caveat. The United Nations, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and even Italy and others who voted for U.N. Resolution 390 cannot renege on their solemn commitment to the letters and spirit of the Resolution.

None of these nations supported Ethiopia's right of access to the sea out of simple expediency, but because it was the right thing to do and the only means of maintaining the peace of the region. Ethiopia's right of access to the sea will remain the kernel of the country's foreign policy and the thread by which the peace of the region will hang.