Background to the Emergence of Dictatorship in Ethiopia Kaleb Gebremeskel

March 12, 201

The murder of Aregawi Gebreyohannes, a member of Medrek (Forum for Democratic Dialogue), the main opposition in Ethiopia, is an early sign of a preemptive strike by the Meles regime before the May 2010 elections take place. It is inevitable that the frightened EPRDF government headed by a notorious dictator would violently attack the opposition that is seeking state power through the democratic process. I say inevitable, in regards to the brutal action of the Meles regime, for two reasons: 1) it is not in the nature of Meles and his coward associates like Seyoum Mesfin, Abay Tsehaye, Addisu Legesse, Tefera Walawa, Bereket Semon, and other opportunist cadres hiding behind the bureaucracy, to govern democratically, let alone observe rule of law and respect basic constitutional rights. These are a gang of riffraff who came to power by the gun and can be dislodged only by the gun. That is the only language they understand, but the opposition does not want to pursue the armed struggle and instead likes to embrace the peaceful and democratic electoral process. 2) This is not the only time the Meles regime has killed its opponents, incarcerated opposition leaders, and violently crashed peaceful demonstrations, a living example being that of the 2005 Kinijit supporters who were targeted by police bullets and in which close to 200 people died.

The killing of Aregawi and the imprisonment of Birtukuan are not isolated incidents. On the contrary, they are extensions and manifestations of dictatorship and state terrorism that have been prevalent in Ethiopia for the last two decades. Why is it that Meles and his entourage were successful in controlling the larger Ethiopian society and the opposition is unable to succeed in Ethiopia? In order to answer this fundamental question, we need to address several inputs that contributed to the rise of a dictatorial regime. Some salient features are:

1. The demise of the Ethiopian progressive forces during the Derg era (1974-1991) and the creation of a political void vis-�-vis a pan-Ethiopian leadership.

2. In the absence of a political leadership that could have led Ethiopia toward the formation of a democratic system, the only militarily organized force was the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and its appendage, the Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement (EPDM, now renamed the Amhara National Democratic Movement [ANDM])

3. The TPLF, by virtue of its political program to liberate Tigray and its membership (Tigrayan only) could have not marched into Addis Ababa without the EPDM boy scouts and the backing of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF)

4. The brutal Mengistu-led government had lost momentum especially in the late 1980s not because the TPLF and EPLF were superior in weaponry and military tactics but mainly because the Ethiopian national army was sabotaged from within and also the Derg had lost the trust of the Ethiopian people. Thanks to the Red Terror that claimed the lives of thousands upon thousands of Ethiopians, the people were demoralized and they were just waiting for the final outcome and the end of the Derg curse, and that is why there were no protestations against the TPLF when it marched in the streets of Addis Ababa in 1991. The Ethiopian people, then, only wished to get rid off a Chiraq (monster) by the name Mengistu, not knowing that another Chiraq by the name Meles had already been installed.

The coming of a new monster means, of course, the sealing off a democracy and the triumph of a dictatorship in Ethiopia. But this is a very simple analysis of a rather profound and complex Ethiopian scenario. In order to come up with a relatively thorough examination of current Ethiopian politics, it is important to dwell on the background of the TPLF and its leaders.

When the TPLF was first organized in the early 1970s and began its guerrilla operations in 1975, it had a secessionist program and no Ethiopia agenda whatsoever, and it was determined to fight any pan-Ethiopian organization, including the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP). Early on, when the TPLF was a tiny guerrilla band in the Dedebit, Shire area, it was beset by series of contradictions within itself. The initially recruited peasant fighters (mostly of brigand background) had conspired to kill the educated leaders who came from the urban areas but failed. One of its leaders known as Musie (Mehari Tecle) was mysteriously killed; another leader by the name Sihul (Gessesse Ayele), a former member of the Ethiopian parliament, was also mysteriously killed. Following the elimination of some leaders, the TPLF invites another Tigrayan front by the name Tigray Liberation Front (TLF) and lured its leaders for a democratic dialogue and possible formation of a united Tigrayan front. But this did not happen. The innocent leaders of the TLF honored the invitation of the TPLF and went to the rendezvous point. After talks and negotiations with the TPLF leaders, not knowing they were in a trap zone, went for their sleep and all were murdered in their sleep.

After the elimination of the TLF, the TPLF solely claimed the Tigrayan agenda and prepared major campaigns against two pan-Ethiopian organizations, namely the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) and the EPRP in western and eastern Tigray respectively.

By the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the TPLF militarily defeated the contending parties in Tigray, and luckily for the TPLF renegade elements of the EPRP in the Gonder area, some 37 of them, defected to the TPLF in Tigray and formed the EPDM as mentioned above. At about the same time, a clique led by Meles Zenawi and Sebhat Nega established a core group and conspired to oust some of the founding leaders like Ghidey Zeratsion and Aregawi Berhe and the latter indeed were expelled from the Party. And in order to justify their actions and legitimize the newly restructured TPLF, the Meles-Sebhat clique founded the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT), a perfect camouflage to mislead the left movements and the so-called socialist countries of the world. Neither the expelled leaders of the TPLF nor the Ethiopian left at large detected that the TPLF leaders were in fact organized to dismantle any left orientation and/or any broad or encompassing Ethiopian agenda.

What most people did not know before and after the TPLF assumed state power is the fact that the Meles-Sebhat clique had established a special covenant with the EPLF. Not even some TPLF leaders, let alone the mass fighters, knew about the hidden agenda of the Meles clique and the Isayas-led Eritrean group. Long before they seized state power in Addis Ababa and Asmara, the joint clique had an agenda to establish governments of their own making in Addis Ababa and assess the Ethiopian political atmosphere. If the Ethiopian people seem to accept the TPLF, the latter will stay and govern from the center. But if the people were to oppose them, they would then unleash their diabolical plan of dismantling Ethiopia. They would have done that by forming a Tigray-Eritrea state. However, as stated above, although the Ethiopian people did not welcome the TPLF with open heart and greeting flowers, it nonetheless did not show opposition. The ouster of the Derg monster, then, satisfied the people.

The TPLF and EPLF ruling over their respective domains for seven years, i.e. from 1991-1997, continued their mutual friendship but due to unforeseen consequences triggered by the issuance of new currencies in both Eritrea and Ethiopia (and not Badme/border issue) and subsequent lack of money exchange that rendered the millions of Ethiopian Birr in the hands of the Eritrean government useless, the relationship between the two countries [governments] seemingly fell apart, and all of a sudden they went to war for mutual destruction. Undeniably the war took place and was concluded by Ethiopia�s victory but soon after schism hit the TPLF and its core leadership was split into two. Again, the Meles-Sebhat clique that had good relations with Isayas Afwerki and that was in control of the government won and the other group who rejected the Algiers Agreement and defended Ethiopia�s sovereignty and territorial integrity were thrown out of office. From this group, Gebru, Aregash, and Tewolde became unemployed and Siye was incarcerated for six years.

As far as I am concerned the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea was probably instigated to oust the �trouble makers� within the TPLF and strengthen the shaken apparatus of Meles. It could also have been a grand design to deliberately disturb the relative peace and stability that had been scored in the Horn of Africa. We may never know of the extent of this war conspiracy but history may one day reveal it. In any event, the Meles-Isayas mission was accomplished! But these two cliques have also underestimated the resolve and determination of the Ethiopian people. During the Badme and Zalambessa battles, for instance, the two leaders were caught off guard when the entire people of Ethiopia stood behind the Ethiopian Defense Forces. If at all, Ethiopia was spared by the unflinching determination of its people and by the TPLF leaders who rejected the Algiers Agreement.

Some disgruntled Ethiopians in the Diaspora who claim to be part of the opposition have sojourned to Asmara in the hope they would advance their political agenda but they too are misled by the apparent quarrel between Meles and Isayas. Moreover, they have a poor judgment of the Horn of Africa politics and they were unable to anticipate that any association with anti-Ethiopia forces is in fact guilty by association and inevitably treasonous and counter productive.

Incidentally, the Ethiopian fate will be decided by the internal dynamics in Ethiopia and when the opposition gathers momentum, no external forces can save the brutal Meles regime. The latter is now frightened because Medrek, a coalition of eight parties, is a formidable party that is not only challenging the status quo but also it is expected to win in many parts of Ethiopia. Men and women of integrity like Bulcha Demeksa, Aregash Adane, Negasso Gidada, Merara Guidina, Beyene Petros, Hailu Araya, and many others lead Medrek. These leaders are bound to liberate Ethiopia from the dictatorial regime of Meles and the EPRDF and despite state terrorism unleashed against them by the government they are determined to fight through to the end.

Given the brutality and intolerance of Meles and his party, the 2010 election, like the 2005 election before it, may end up in the bloody attack of the opposition by police forces. But if things go well and a relatively civil electoral process is conducted, Medrek may not capture state power but it would definitely secure sizable seats in the parliament and could enjoy legitimacy as the main opposition in the legislature.

Unless the EPRDF resorts to a violent suppression of the opposition, it will be defeated by its own policies and political program. Notwithstanding the claim of the EPRDF to have answered the question of nationalities in Ethiopia by forming the language-ethnic based administrative states (Kilil) the objective was not to meet the peoples� demand (and the people have not demanded for an EPRDF style restructuring of Ethiopia) but to divide and rule them. Now the very federal structure engineered by the EPRDF has come to haunt it because its cadres have to be fielded in their respective Kilil and districts and they may or may not get support from the people of their localities. However, as a safety mechanism the EPRDF had used its affiliated parties like the TPLF, ANDM, and OPDO and dispatched candidates to the regional states. For instance, representing the TPLF, Meles and Seyoum would go to Tigray; representing the ANDM, Addisu Legesse and Tefera Walwa would be fielded in the Amhara regional state; and similarly the OPDO candidates would run in the Oromia region.

In the last 18 years, with the exception of Andinet, only the EPRDF could have fielded its candidates all over Ethiopia. Now Medrek can field candidates in most parts of Ethiopia, thanks to the eight party coalitions and the mass support from the Ethiopian people. In Tigray alone, Medrek has now managed to field in 34 out of 38 electoral districts, and it goes the same in the Amhara, Oromia, and other regions. This hard fact has now became a nightmare to the EPRDF and it is highly probable that the latter may either steal the ballot boxes as it has done in the past or affirm its dictatorship by unleashing state terrorism. Another disadvantage that the EPRDF would face in the 2010 elections is the fact that it desperately needs to replace its old guards who are either retiring or are not seeking re-election. Sebhat Nega has retired at least from the leading post of the TPLF; Addisu Legesse, Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Chair of the EPRDF; Tefera Walwa, Minister of Capacity Building; Bereket Semon, Minister of Government Communications Affairs; and Tsegay Berhe, President of the Regional State of Tigray are not going to run for office. Abudulla Gemeda, President of the Oromia regional state will step down from his post and run for the federal parliament. From the old guards only Seyoum Mesfin and Abay Tsehaye would stay around with the dictator but they are the weakest link of the EPRDF and the Medrek group can easily outshine them in the electoral contest. Despite so many disadvantages in logistics and finance and access to the media and despite severe obstacles imposed upon Medrek by the Meles dictatorship, the main opposition could become successful in the May 2010 elections and that would be the beginning of the end of dictatorship and state terrorism in Ethiopia. Given the light at the end of the tunnel, thus, Medrek should not rethink its bid for power following the murder of Aregawi. If at all, the loss of Aregawi should embolden and strengthen Medrek and I say to the Medrek leaders keep on marching and never give up!

The author can be reached at [email protected]