Yes,
a Fake Election, but for what Purpose?
Messay
Kebede
I
am still struggling to make sense of Sunday�s election from the
viewpoint of the Woyanne government itself. There is no doubt that its
results represent a crushing and demoralizing defeat for the opposition.
Such a colossal defeat shows once again the pettiness and the
self-defeating impact of the disputes among opposition forces by
underlying the imperative of unity as the only path to acquire any
political weight in a democratic contest. It also reflects the extent to
which the opposition has underestimated the power of manipulation and
intimidation that the Meles�s regime still possesses. As a result, it
jumped into the electoral contest without sufficient guarantees of
impartiality, a position inspired by the prevailing belief that the regime
is on its last legs.
But the big enigma of Sunday�s election
has to do with the exact benefit that the Woyanne ruling clique is gaining
from a defeat of this magnitude of the opposition. The more the regime
denies that votes were rigged and voters and candidates intimidated,
harassed, and threatened, the less easily answerable becomes the question
of knowing why the regime cooked up a victory claiming 99.66 % of
parliamentary seats. Let alone external observers and governments, any
person alien to Ethiopian politics would conclude that such a result can
be obtained only if the opposition has been stifled or non-existent.
If the Woyanne regime wanted to shore up
its legitimacy badly tarnished by its electoral defeat in 2005, the
reasonable thing would have been to give some seats to the opposition,
thereby providing some semblance of fairness to the election. To the
extent that a total victory takes away all credibility from the electoral
process and, therefore, defeats the initial purpose of recognition, the
decision to conduct a fake election resulting in the ousting of the
opposition from the parliament sounds discordant indeed. Hence my
question: what is the purpose of plotting a fake election that lamentably
fails to convince anyone, since we can assume that Meles and his clique
expect some king of benefit from the exercise?
I have played with various hypotheses; I
have also reflected on what some commentators had already said or written,
such as the construction of a totalitarian state or the deliberate
intention of undermining nonviolent forms of struggle. These two reasons
are valid: the eradication of the opposition completes the construction of
a full-fledged totalitarian state, just as it presents nonviolent
opposition as a hopeless strategy. However, these two goals hardly agree
with the equally important need that the Woyanne regime has to be
recognized as a legitimate winner by the international community.
All the same, let us look closer: there is
more than one way of obtaining international recognition. There is the
democratic way of majority vote; there is also the default way
demonstrating the utter insignificance or unviability of the opposition.
As far as the Woyanne regime is concerned, Sunday�s election has shown
to Ethiopians and the whole world that there is no opposition to speak of.
In my view, the decision to concoct an election purging the opposition
from the parliament reflects the TPLF�s complete desertion of the very
idea of free and fair elections. The TPLF elite has drawn from its 2005
electoral debacle the final conclusion that it cannot rely on any sort of
fair competition.
On the other hand, one of the implications
of the total defeat of the peaceful opposition is to discourage nonviolent
struggles and push more people toward armed struggle. The prospect of
widened violent confrontations will allow the Woyanne to openly give up
its democratic fa�ade and crack down opponents, henceforth accused of
using unconstitutional means to come to power. In this game of violence,
the Woyanne regime is better equipped and experienced and can also gain
recognition as a government defending itself against terrorism.
The other and by far the most important
implication of the crushing defeat of the opposition is its ability to
provide emotional soothing. The humiliation of the 2005 election is still
fresh in the mind of many Woyanne leaders and cadres. From the viewpoint
of removing an emotional wound, the landslide victory supplies a
demonstration of force that humiliates both opposition leaders and those
millions of Ethiopians who voted for Kinijit. It shows, by hook or
by crook, the total control of the country by the Woyanne totalitarian
machine. In other words, it says: here is the bare fact, deal with it!
From such a resounding demonstration of
force, we can even expect a timid opening of the political space. Now that
things have been straightened out, the game of �free election� can
resume with the understanding that the right to oppose��a gracious
gift of the victor��must never include the goal of defeating the TPLF.
|