

Echoes of war and the imperative to mobilize our good senses

By Mitiku Adisu

The greatest assassin of life is haste, the desire to reach things before the right time which means overreaching them.

—Juan Ramon Jimenez, 1881-1958

Introduction

These are difficult days. Once again we are hearing echoes of war. Words are being bandied about in support of or against a clash between Ethiopia and the Council of Somali Islamic Courts (CSICs). The issue need not have been presented as either/or, however. I believe the timing, not the act itself of defending one's nation, should be the point of contention.

Some foresee “clear and present danger” and call for increased military intervention in the defense of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian “territorial integrity.” Others suggest prudence, transparency, and altogether a different set of priorities. Wittingly or not, both sides seem to convey deep concern for the welfare of the nation.

Things we don't know

We have no guarantees that once established the TFG will sustain itself; we can't know if the same TFG will abandon claims Somalis have been making to eastern Ethiopia; there is no way of knowing that such claims will not be used to later galvanize local support. We are not sure if the information we are getting from the embattled Ethiopian leader, the TFG, diplomatic communities, and CSICs is not to give credence to their side of the story and thus promote their respective interests. There is a war of words going on the sole purpose of which is to heighten uncertainty and achieve a mission otherwise impossible to achieve.

Things we know

So what do we know about this war? First, defending the territorial integrity of our nation, to put it in perspective, has also been the *raison d'etre* of Teworos, Yohannes IV, Menilik, Haileselassie, and Derg. Second, we know that the CSICs have brought order to Somalia much more effectively than could the weak TFG. Third, we know CSICs declared war on Ethiopia but did not attack. Are these grounds for intervention? Fourth, there is the fear that Muslim Oromos, supported by Eritrea, are planning to incite Muslim Oromos in eastern Ethiopia. Fifth, the presence of an “invading” Ethiopian force has resulted in rallying Somalis behind CSICs. Sixth, the report that Ethiopia has few military advisers to the TFG has in fact been revised thrice to a few hundred fighters to 8,000 and now to helicopter gunships and fighter planes. Has the die been cast? Is the nation being dragged into a long-term war? What should be the appropriate citizen response?

The considered opinion of this writer is that a) the timing and manner of intervention is wrong b) the ruling party in Ethiopia is anxious about the level of domestic opposition and tension within its own ranks (observe the constant re-shuffles and lay-offs) c) a major policy decision always preceded those times when making concessions and internal dissent threatened the survival of the ruling party core; a policy “bang” always worked its magic by turning public attention away from pressing issues of the day. A big “bang” has a double duty in that it effectively drowns out small bangs which on their own would have otherwise constituted a big blast; big policy “bangs” provide cover for taking punitive measures at a later date. The disgruntled among returning peacekeeping forces to Liberia and Rwanda is a case in point. Their demand for and protest over withheld pay was so sensitive that it was arrested in its tracks before it spread to other sectors. A year or so later, however, it was learned that the soldiers were quietly banished to a desolate camp in the east under the cover of the May 2005 elections “bang”. What then could be the political byproduct of the ongoing war? In other words, *no cost has been too high* to salvage the ruling party from folding [PM Meles has re-iterated that there is no alternative to his party and that anarchy (“Armageddon”) will reign in the event that his party disintegrated.] Here are few samples of what I mean by policy “bangs”:

- 1993: Eritrea broke away at a time when power-sharing could have meant minority role for the then TPLF;
- 1998, 2000: War with Eritrea began amidst growing public opposition; ruling party in-fighting was followed by deaths, imprisonments and party restructuring; World Bank conditionalities was agreed toⁱ to ward off international criticism and access a relatively lucrative source of funding;
- 2006: opposition in Addis is growing; as Addis goes, so goes the country; could this explain the timing of the Somalia campaign?

The faces of war-making

Those favoring full or limited intervention either narrate regional history as evidence for Somali irredentism or cajole the reader to separate the blunders of this government from the explosive situation about to engulf the nation. In *Derg* era parlance, we are urged to temporarily set aside our grievances and put “Ethiopia First.”

The *Ethiopian Reporter*,ⁱⁱ in its beguiling 17 December 2006 editorial also attempts to provoke strong emotions for the ingratitude shown us by Somalis and others for being good neighbors and recommends the government review its policy toward these countries. Incidentally, Somalis also complain that Prime Minister Meles and his comrades have not shown gratitude for the sanctuary they provided them not a long time ago.

The idea of a “limited intervention” could be misleading, however. It suggests that the impending clash is controllable and overlooks the fact that wars are a messy enterprise. What guarantees are in place to stave off reprisals that such intervention would trigger? Could the idea have been put forth to justify sending Special Forces into Somalia in the first place?

Appeals are made to the gallantry of Ethiopians to defend the motherland and defeat extremist elements. These cite recent clashes in Jimma and draw a worse case scenario if similar situations are not swiftly dealt with. Unity in diversity is become the catchphrase. The age-old metaphor of Mother Ethiopia with “striped womb” is lustily invoked to underscore the multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity of her offsprings. The feud with Eritrea (a one time partner) is restated in so many words to rally the skeptic; a vigorous campaign is in full swing to enlist local and international support.

We are reminded once again that “the Prime Minister seems to be learning from his mistakes” and that the nation will unite to repulse the aggressor and come out strong. Why does this sound familiar? Tense moments seem to strike conciliatory and hollow notes; happy days only contempt.ⁱⁱⁱ In the end, these arguments betray the sentiment that the current leadership is delivering on all fronts, albeit with pardonable spots, and that it is time for chatterboxes (especially the Diaspora) to shut up and fall behind the “wise” and irreplaceable leadership of incumbents (or more specifically, PM Meles). There is, admittedly, too much talking going on; to say a leader or a party is irreplaceable is neither healthy nor good leadership.

On the other side of the divide are those who reject (or at least doubt the necessity of) military intervention on the grounds a) that the current leadership, especially the Prime Minister is untrustworthy and has lost all credibility; his record of protecting the nation’s interests is dismal; he is a divider, not a uniter; he has been consistent in not telling the truth^{iv} b) that Ethiopia has no right to intervene in Somali affairs; Somalis like all nations desire a life of stability after years of anarchy c) the fact that the Ethiopian army is on Somali soil on the pretext of a coming *jihad* is unprecedented in our history with our neighbors d) that the “clear and present danger” for Ethiopia is rather the violation internally of democratic processes and human rights and not Somali politics. In the estimation of these, intervening in Somalia to defend a so-called “democratically elected” TFG while elected representatives languish in maximum-security prisons on trumped up charges is indefensible and hypocritical e) some also question why a contingent of Eritrean forces in Somalia is more worrisome than thousands lining the border with Tigrai.

It is unfortunate to observe how much ethnicity continues to shape the current national discourse in various Ethiopian websites.^v There is also the general realization that the government is overstretched to a point of not being able to maintain its hold on power and at the same time wage war on several fronts.

Setting the stage

Ethiopian history has all too often been the history of individuals. Prime Minister Meles like his predecessors is blamed for our nation’s ailments. However, singling out the leader has not brought us the relief we so much hoped for; rather, it led to a culture of flawed judgments and, at times, irrational hostility. Undue focus on the current Prime Minister has given him free publicity and created a common but shaky ground for the opposition. It also failed to address the root causes of the present malaise, which, in short,

is shortsightedness, ineptness, and an exclusionary policy (or better still, a policy of selective inclusion). History of a nation need not be the autobiography only of an individual or a select group; merely agreeing to oppose cannot substitute for a principled vision.

One observes excessive external influence on domestic politics. Naturally, some fight for the status quo for the simple reason that, in the end, they have much to lose. Members of the present ruling class have emerged from relatively modest beginnings to undreamt of social and economic heights within a span of fifteen years. We are told that several maintain secret accounts in foreign banks.^{vi} The same was true of members of the previous government and we have no reason to believe it will be any different in the foreseeable future. In other words, ethnicity or class will always be a cover for greed and petty criminality.

Others would like the world to acknowledge that they stand for “One Ethiopia.” The Ethiopia they brandish, however, is one created in their own image and that to fit in one must be of a certain shape and size. And yet for others the name “Ethiopia” has become anathema and for a few more a term only of convenience. There need to be convergences of thought and practice to accommodate those divergences. The source of the problem so far has been the standing of our leaders in and outside of government and their failure to set a cohesive tone.

It is inconceivable to work toward a common goal without a unifying ideal. Our obsession with ethnicity^{vii} and slowness early on to organize may have caught us off guard and greatly affected our rational faculty; looking inwards for too long has been unproductive; thinking outside the box and in terms of the ideal of a large Ethiopian tent may be the one missing ingredient to bring discipline to our politics.

Murky path, murky past

A lot remains unclear in regard to the challenges that lie ahead. However, this is no reason to conclude that the situation is desperate and warrants military intervention. It could be that the government is more desperate than recent developments have suggested. For the government, the desperation may be due mainly to simmering popular discontent, political overstretch and problems associated with enlisting personnel. Unlike the 1998-2000 wars funding may not be a major issue now but the war itself is more than likely to drag on for years. As G.K. Chesterton once remarked, “One of the great disadvantages of hurry is that it takes such a long time.” Whence then the wisdom in hurrying to join a battle of a thousand fronts? Could such a policy be realized when the politically active segment of the population at home and abroad remains skeptical and/or actively opposed to it?

Indeed, the integrity of the nation’s territory to the north and northwest is still in limbo; the territory to the east could soon turn into a zone of protracted skirmishes; there are pockets of insecurity in western and southwestern regions. The essence of a unitary state

is constitutionally watered down—at least that is the prevailing perception. These activities have more to do with government policy than any thing else.

If at all we learned from the 1998-2000 wars with Eritrea, it is that the conduct and cessation of the war displayed a distinct pattern. There was suddenness and illogicality to the conflict. Information was tightly controlled. The opposition was in disarray. Fierce organizational and policy battle between the ruling party elite ensued leading to a break up, retribution, and realignment. There was intense speculation and disagreement on the genesis of the war and the course it was taking. There were rumors about secret deals between the former comrades-in-arms long before seizing state power. All told, 70,000 to 100,000^{viii} lives perished on both sides, not including the toll on infrastructure, the environment and on the goodwill of the two peoples. Are we witnessing re-enactment of events of the recent past? Will we be seeing removal of party bosses?

Our government claimed, quite hastily we realized, military and diplomatic victory—only to go back on its word and issue a statement to the effect that “dusty *Badme*” was not worth fighting over and that the Boundary Agreement was “final and binding.” The government also has been in the habit of sending out contradictory messages: Nations and Nationalities could secede but not the Oromo (discussing, not endorsing); we need a vigorous opposition but it has to be loyal; peace and development but wars every 5-6 years; de-centralization but re-centralization at will; freedom of the press and clamp down on free press; good governance and rampant nepotism; setting up independent Commission of Inquiry but tampering with the results, etc.

The Consensus?

We have a stake in the welfare of our nation and hence duty bound to speak up on such a calamitous and complex issue as war. None of us has the final word on how events will unfold; there simply are too many imponderables; we have our shortcomings and live in less than perfect world. That is why we should give heed to dissenting voices. True, those in government are there to represent the rest of us; that does not, however, mean they are given *carte blanche* to suppress, intimidate, or bypass those with opposing viewpoints. We are all in this together; issues of this magnitude are bound to affect us enormously and cannot be left to any one group. Dissent or no dissent, it should all be offered in the spirit of civility and goodwill.

It is unfortunate that those who have little or no say in the matter are the ones that will endure the full brunt of the war. Members of parliament, high-ranking officials, those living abroad and those with connections will not be sending their sons and daughters in harms way. It is also interesting how the staging of this war is strikingly similar in its timing and dissemination of information to the 1998-2000 pre-war exercises. The difference this time is that Diaspora groups, in marked difference from their previous stance, have mounted opposition to policies of the ruling party.

- There are lingering questions regarding the veracity of public information. We are told that the issue at hand was thoroughly debated in parliament. Indeed, there were

few dissenting voices or at least those advising caution. However, we are not certain if the voices were not a decoy to give the debates an air of legitimacy. Tracing the dissenters' track record, the latter is probably closer to the truth.^{ix} The parable of our politics is such that one is either in parliament or in prison. One wonders if some in parliament are not indeed the real prisoners!

- There is concern that the explosive issue in the Horn Region is being mishandled and steered away from the possibility of a peaceful resolution.^x
- Herman Cohen made the comment that

“Ethiopia probably (is) feeding false intelligence” to the U.S. and that “Ethiopians are deadly afraid of Moslem control ... So they want to keep the Islamists out of power, and they will bring the U.S. into it, if they can.”^{xi}

Mr. Cohen may have had access to reports (including from Ethiopians) to support the first half of his conjoined statement; the second half, however, must be understood as mere speculation because it insinuates Ethiopian Moslems^{xii} have unwholesome motive and unnecessarily pits them against Christians. Ethiopians should utterly reject Christian v. Moslem categorization.^{xiii} We should also not lose sight of the fact that Ethiopia has survived for millennia on that very spot despite internal and external onslaught on her cherished values.

- The United Nations Secretary-General and several policy analysts^{xiv} have reiterated the consequences of backing the wrong group and that failure to censure allies for their involvement in the region would exacerbate the already volatile situation.^{xv}
- We also read in sworn testimonies,^{xvi} communiqués,^{xvii} and statements from advocacy groups,^{xviii} concerned individuals, and civic groups, etc, that the government of Ethiopia has at heart its own power interests and not the interests of the nation. Fighting terrorism, these add, is its essential tool to stay in the good graces of donors.

Below is a tentative time-line that hopefully will elucidate the argument that the government may be panicky and is having to choose between making concessions (that is, releasing and confirming duly elected leaders, etc) or going to war alone. Either way, there is a sense in which the setting of a national agenda is slipping away from incumbents.

Timeline: War but Dialogue?

14 December 2006

Washingtonpost interviews Meles. Here is an interesting quote:

Q. Do you have any plans to try out for a third term?

A. My party? My party will try not only for a third term but for a tenth term.

Q. And you personally?

A. And me personally, I think I've had enough.^{xix}

(Is this a premonition? The interviewer should have followed it up with, “What if your party wants you?” For similar exchanges, please refer to 4 July 2005 *BBC Hardball Interview*)^{xx}

13 December 2006

- Mengistu is convicted of genocide; Mengistu adds “the butcher of Addis” to his many titles (though in reality the mayhem that attended the revolution could not have happened without the active participation of the EPRP, MEISON, etc.) Historians will do well to remember that what ever happened after the collapse of Emperor Haileselassie’s government happened because of complicity between *Derg* and socialist revolutionists.

11 December 2006

- “Addis Ababa University's President, Professor Andreas Eshete, is establishing a human rights centre under the auspices of the university.”^{xxi} Some fear involving the university in party politics will compromise its autonomy. It should be noted here that reports pertaining to human rights in Ethiopia have come mainly from *Ethiopian Human Rights Commission* (EHRCO) and *Amnesty International* (AI). Both groups have been a thorn in the side of the government. Forming parallel agencies to displace and discredit the noncompliant has been the hallmark of this government.

8 December 2006

- “First ever Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Day celebrated with pomp”; the write-up makes self-congratulatory remarks to the effect that the 1994 Constitution finally unshackled nations and nationalities from the prison of a forced unity.^{xxii}

30 November 2006

- Parliamentary debates to endorse a war to defend the nation’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

November 2006

- An independent mapmaking body is commissioned to demarcate border on maps and leave the setting of physical boundaries to the two nations.

November 2006

- PM Meles sets aside his prepared speech at *Youth and 21st Century Leadership* conference to say few words about “storming heaven,” “wisdom,” and the “fear of God” among other things.^{xxiii}

November 2006

- Professor Ephraim Isaac attempts to mediate the release of jailed elected opposition leaders; the government's condition was that the leaders stay out of politics!

15-17 November 2006

- PM Meles invited to *EU-Africa Week*.

November 2006

- Army defections to Eritrea and dismissals of high-ranking army personnel; diplomats, journalists, and lawyers seeking asylum.

October 2006

- *Dinqnesh* travels to Texas only to receive scolding for traveling in breach of a charter agreed upon by her home country.^{xxiv} Was this a PR coup in disguise?

October 2006

- Religious clashes in Jimma and Dembi Dollo results in several deaths and damages to property; some insist the government had a hand in it in the hope of mobilizing the populace for its Somalia campaign.

September 2006

- The "Ethiopia Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights Advancement Act of 2006" is blocked (at a cost of \$50,000/month paid to a lobbyist firm.)^{xxv}

20 July 2006

- Ethiopian troops cross into Somalia.

11 July 2006

- World Bank Chief pays a visit, talks "political harmony," not good governance (as per his presidency's stated policy) or the upholding of democratic principles; debts are cancelled, funds released.^{xxvi}

May 2006

- The New Economic Foundation (NES) reports^{xxvii} cash exodus ('laundering') from Ethiopia, etc, "had risen noticeably over the past five years...from Ethiopia rising 103 per cent."

15 May 2005

- May 2005 elections; opposition does remarkably well; state of emergency is declared; mass demonstrations followed, thousands jailed; 193 killed (reported then as less than 40).

Conclusion

One conclusion is that the government has assessed the situation and made dire predictions and is taking the risk of going to war to quiet down domestic din and rising tension within its own ranks. Reviewing the time-line, one cannot help but come to the conclusion that all is not well with the ruling party.

Derg and the socialist revolutionists of the 1970s and 1980s may have terrorized the populace into submission; the current government, on the other hand, has inadvertently helped to create a formidable opposition. Consequently, releasing jailed opposition leaders has become as much a headache to the ruling party as keeping them behind bars.

Seen in this light, the government did an opposition in disarray a favor by imprisoning its leadership; a sizable majority among the more active citizenry has shown a zeal for organizing heretofore unknown. The government lost a chance when it failed to take the high road of seeking a compromise solution with the opposition.

Is this war necessary? There is nothing to suggest that we answer this in the affirmative—for now. All efforts must be made to avoid turning our nation into a theatre for regional conflict. We are the same generation that saw the destructiveness of Cold War proxy wars. The painful experiences of those years continue to impact the way we conduct ourselves. Let us, therefore, err on the side of caution.

Those supporting war with Somalia cannot fully anticipate the ramifications of their decision. Over-reaching one's capabilities and underestimating other's resourcefulness have always exacerbated politically resolvable problems. Emperor Haileselassie, *Derg* and Socialist revolutionists both misjudged the resolve of Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgents and their supporters. The current regime seems to have forgotten the costly education it received in the bushes considering how it treats the Oromo, the Anuak, and above all *Kinijit*.

Failure to change course to realize voter aspirations will certainly have far-reaching repercussions. We may soon be witnessing formation of extraordinary alliances and other face-saving measures. Compromises will have to be made; compromises will be made. Refusing to make concessions has kept the ruling party core together; making concessions will gradually introduce a serious fissure within the ruling party ranks and possibly alter its status beyond recognition. Retreating from its current position of aggressive intervention in Somalia will not help matters either. In effect, the government has locked itself up in a tight corner and is furiously searching for the wrong key. The ruling party has stepped on too many toes; it cannot continue on that track forever. The

way out is to go back to the drawing board and uphold results of the democratic processes it had initiated. That act will dignify it, not diminish it.

There could also come about a spontaneous public uprising similar to the February 1974 revolution, perhaps bringing to a close a chapter in our turbulent history. Keeping the lid on the opposition through imprisonment, censorship, round-ups, and blackmail will only build the pressure and hasten change. Our history is filled with false starts and abrupt changes. May the God of Ethiopia have mercy on us!

What of the Diaspora? Foremost is that leadership of the opposition should be left primarily to those close to ground zero. Shared or split leadership is a recipe for disaster. The Diaspora should primarily play a supportive role. Leadership responsibilities should be assigned according to competence and principle, not individual wishes and partisan politics. Those living abroad should not assume they could get on the plane and on arrival assume some important public office; rather they should await invitation from the ground crew. Secondly, it should tone down its rhetoric. It should be willing to encourage the good wherever and whenever it sees one. It should not be the source of a vindictive spirit and insecurity for those with a different opinion. To hold the present government responsible for every evil under the sun or conversely, to fail to appreciate the good that has been set in motion only perpetuates the distrust stalking our beloved homeland and its people.

Finally, *Kinijit* and its supporters would do well to resist the silly idea of presenting themselves as saviors of Ethiopia; that is not possible in a real world. The best any group can do is to enable maximum participation while minimizing individual and party tyranny.^{xxviii}

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Endnotes

ⁱ We were told agreeing to Bank conditionalities was interpreted as surrendering national sovereignty and that it led to the split within the ruling party.

ⁱⁱ Ethiopianreporter.com

ⁱⁱⁱ One may want to browse interviews, directives and editorials in (pro) government web sites.

^{iv} Reference is made to reported 26 deaths, which later turned out to be 193, etc. See also “Millennium Resolution,” Ethiomedia.com

^v This simply shows the toll dwelling too long on ethno-centric themes exacts on our social interactions.

^{vi} “Third World cash exodus ‘points to laundering’”; <http://news.independent.co.uk>

^{vii} Dr. Messay’s “The Ethnicization of Ethiopian Politics,” is a perceptive analysis on the subject. See, Ethiopian Review.com

^{viii} Considering the reported 26 deaths (now standing at 193) following the post-May 2006 elections demonstrations, it would not be surprising if the 1998-2000 war casualties is five-folds than reported.

^{ix} “Four big mouths, four big lies,” Enset.com

^x www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/editorial

^{xi} www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/

^{xii} Ethiopian Moslems are at least three times the total population of Somalia.

^{xiii} Another example is Landay and Bengali’s 23 December 2006 article where the authors’ state “the United States tacitly supports Christian-ruled Ethiopia’s intervention into the overwhelmingly Muslim country,” ‘U.S. policy in the Horn may help al Qaeda: Experts warn,’ posted in ethiomedia.com. To be defined in those terms will drive a wedge between us and cede control of our agenda to outside experts. It is worth noting that the conflict in the Sudan was also set as Muslim north v. Christian south. Emerging problems are neither Christian nor Muslim but Ethiopian; not Tigre or Oromo, not Kinijit or EPRDF but Ethiopian. Ethiopia is and should be for Ethiopians. “Christian” West or “Muslim” East should not be allowed to play a central role in Ethiopian affairs. It is sufficient here to point out the manner in which the recent clashes in Jimma and Dembi were covered by Middle Eastern and North American papers. (See, “Nine Muslims dead in Ethiopia riots with Christians,” *Middle Times*, 6 October 2006; “Muslim Extremists attack Christians in Ethiopia,” *Christianity Today*, 20 October 2006)

^{xiv} “Getting It Wrong In Somalia, Again”, www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped; www.crisisgroup.org

^{xv} <http://allafrica.com/stories/200611200371.html>

^{xvi} (OLF) testimony before EU Sub-Committee on Human Rights

http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/News/2006/Testimony_Human_Rights.htm

^{xvii} Kiinijit issued a communiqué in *Amharic* entitled, **ጦርነት የኢትዮጵያ ሕዝብ ምርጫ አይደለም**

[*War is not the choice of Ethiopian people*]; <http://www.kinijitethiopia.org/docs/editorial/Amharic.pdf>

^{xviii} Statement by *Ethiopian American Civic Advocacy* (EACA) in favor of talks rather than war under the leadership of the current government; www.ethiomedia.com/addfile/deja_vu_of_war.html

^{xix} www.washingtonpost.com

^{xx} <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/4649373.stm>

^{xxi} <http://seminawork.blogspot.com/2006/12/andreas-eshete-establishes-human.html>

^{xxii} Ethioobserver.net/federal_day.html

^{xxiii} **ጠላቅና ቀንድ ያለን ዲፕሎማሲ ይመርመር፣ ይፈተሽ፣ ይስተካከል”**

<http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=9982>

^{xxiv} <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/11/061101-lucy-tour.html>; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/27/AR2006102701753.html>

^{xxv} http://www.ethiomedia.com/addfile/repression_tightens.html

^{xxvi} “World Bank Resumes Aid to Ethiopia,” *Reuters* (13 July 2006).

^{xxvii} <http://news.independent.co.uk/business/news>

^{xxviii} I often have my “what if” moments: What if Ethiopian leaders got together and for once refused to feud among themselves? What if they came to the realization that they are getting on in years and their infighting has disallowed the enjoyment of the fruit of their struggle and that outsiders have simply gotten free reign in their affairs? What if it dawned on some that the haranguing is not worth the loss of self-respect and diminished quality of life as a result of rootlessness, restlessness and hate? What if few of the leaders would play an enabling role to a point of not seeking power position for themselves in order to advance the cause of the nation? What if ...